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The Political Business Cycle in Ontario:
An Empirical Analysis of Financial and Demographic
Data across Medium to Large-Sized Ontario Municipalities

Abstract
This research empirically examines whether or not there is a political business cycle in
Ontario municipalities from 2000 to 2006. First, an overview of the research on political
business cycles that has come before this is undertaken. Following this, a research
method is proposed and results of this research are described. Analysis of the data
revealed that there is weak evidence for the existence of a political business cycle in
Ontario municipalities from 2000 to 2006. Additionally, conclusions are drawn with
regards to the relation between employment and election years, as well as what
constitute visible expenditures.
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Chapter One - Introduction
The idea of a political business cycle is not new. It was first described in detail
and brought to popular attention by Nordhaus in 1975. However, the idea behind it is
reasonably obvious and has probably existed for as long as elections have. The idea
behind the political business cycle is, in its most basic form, as follows. Politicians want
to get re-elected. The re-election of politicians depends largely on economic conditions.
Politicians have at least some control over economic conditions. From this situation,
which occurs in every democracy around the world, it is not too much of a stretch to
assume that in some places, some politicians will seek to use their influence to
manipulate the economy to maximize their chances of re-election (Schultz, 1995, 79).
The most famous example of a political business cycle comes from the 1972
United States Presidential election. In this election, the incumbent, Richard Nixon, was
justifiably seen to be engaging in significant pre-electoral manipulation of the economy
(Drazen, 2000, 75). This situation is regarded by some commentators as being a
catalyst for research into the topic (Drazen, 2000, 75). As Nordhaus’ influential work
which would go onto stimulate much more research into the topic was published in 1975,
this seems quite possible.
However, despite the above example and many others like it, the theory and
study of political business cycles owe more to the intuitive plausibility of the issue rather
than to its empirical track record (Schultz, 1995, 79). Nordhaus’ work was able to lay the
theoretical groundwork for the issue, however, the empirical results from Nordhaus’
study showed that empirically finding evidence of political business cycles may be more
difficult than initially thought. Much of the research that followed led to similar
conclusions.
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There are many theoretical arguments for why political business cycles do exist
or why they should exist. However, empirically finding evidence of political business
cycles has proven to be quite difficult (Drazen, 2000, 76). A number of reasons for this
will be suggested later. However, the state of the research on political business cycles is
as follows. There is much academic support for the theory that underlies political
business cycles. That is not to say that everyone agrees on every detail of the theories,
just that there is relative agreement about why political business cycles occur. However,
on whether or not political business cycles exist empirically, and to what extent they exist
if they do, there is much less agreement (Drazen, 2000, 76). Many studies into the
empirics of the political business cycle find that there is little to no evidence that political
business cycles actually exist. However, there is also research that suggests that
political business cycles do exist on somewhat of a wide scale.
This research project was designed in this context. The theory underpinning
political business cycles is relatively established. However, whether or not they exist is
open to much debate. This research seeks to examine the latter within the limited
context of Ontario municipalities.
The purpose of this research is to attempt to replicate the results of a study by
Veiga & Veiga which was published in 2007. The study examines all mainland
Portuguese municipalities from 1979 to 2001 and found strong evidence to support the
notion that political business cycles exist and are influential at the local level, at least in
Portugal. This study was chosen for a number of reasons. It is a recent study. As well, it
features strong findings on the issue. Finally, the methodology of the study seemed to be
well developed and thoughtful. For these reasons it seemed appropriate to use the study
by Veiga & Veiga as a base for this research.
There are many implications that follow from the existence of political business
cycles. The existence of political business cycles may lead to inefficiencies in the
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economy (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 63). As well, the existence of political business cycles
undercuts democracy as the electorate is manipulated by politicians. With such serious
consequences, whether or not political business cycles exist in any democratic context is
an important question.
This research will study whether or not there is empirical evidence of political
business cycles in Ontario municipalities with populations over 20,000 over the time
period of 2000 to 2006. The limited scope of this study, in comparison to the study it will
attempt to replicate the results of, is due to a number of factors including limited data,
the difference in context between Portugal and Ontario, and the limited research
capacity of those involved with this project.
The rest of this paper will be organized as follows. The following chapter reviews
scholarly literature. As well, a number of previous studies into the empirics of the political
business cycle will be reviewed. In the third chapter the research design of this study will
be presented, and a number of hypotheses will be put forward. The fourth chapter will
present the results of the research. The fifth chapter will briefly discuss some of the
limitations of the results. The sixth chapter will be an analysis of the results. Finally, the
seventh chapter will overview implications for the theory of the political business cycle
that arise from this research, and opportunities for future research will be discussed.
This research project comes to the conclusion that there is some empirical
evidence for the existence of a political business cycle in Ontario municipalities. The
evidence is not overpowering, however, it also is not insignificant.
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Chapter Two - Literature Review
The academic study of political business cycles was initiated by Nordhaus with
his 1975 article entitled “The Political Business Cycle.” In the original model, national
governments use monetary policy to improve their chances of re-election by making an
employment/inflation trade-off. Specifically, leading up to an election expansionary
monetary policy is used to produce a pre-election boom, of which one result is lower
unemployment. The inflationary consequences of these actions are not felt until after the
election (Nordhaus, 1975, 184). Nordhaus’ model was highly influential in setting the
stage for early research into the issue of political business cycles. However, there were
a number of issues with his model which soon became problematic.
Nordhaus’ model relied on voters who were repeatedly tricked again as their
expectations regarding inflation were wholly past-looking. Voters in his model did not
anticipate the future at all. The presence of a public who had experienced political
business cycles before and would not anticipate future inflation to rise in the face of high
current expenditures led to criticisms of irrationality (Drazen, 2000, 80). Since its initial
formulation, the theory behind political business cycles has become well grounded in
micro-economic theory, and has dispensed with irrationality. The explanations for
political business cycles that are driven by monetary policy manipulations have largely
been discredited (Drazen, 2000, 95). However, the theory is alive and well and now
focuses on fiscal policy manipulations (in some cases along with monetary policy
manipulations) in an environment where irrationality is not an option (Baleiras & Santos,
2000, 122; Drazen, 2000, 96). As a result, the current theoretical models that argue that
political business cycles will be created by politicians in democratic systems now have
much explanatory power and form a strong ground for empirical research into the
subject.
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The theory behind the political business cycle is that politicians, seeking to
maximize their chances of re-election, strategically manipulate the public economy
(Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 46). How politicians are said to influence the economy depends
on what level of government is being studied, as this theory can be applied to national,
regional, or local governments. 1 At the local level the manipulations can involve
incumbent politicians lowering taxes, raising expenditures, and manipulating the
composition of expenditures. In the manipulations, highly visible forms of expenditures
are preferred (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 46; Sakurai & Menezes-Filho, 2008, 310). Capital
expenditures are more easily varied than operational expenditures and thus there should
be more variation in capital expenditures. Specifically, highly visible investment
expenditures such as streets and complementary works are relevant to political business
cycles (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 46). The election year represents the most opportune time
for increased spending or decreased taxes as the length of time that most voters
recollect is short (Drazen, 2000, 82). Finally, it is argued that political business cycles
are more likely to succeed in less advanced democracies as the electorate will be less
likely to understand what is occurring (Drazen, 2000, 96). However, there is also reason
to suspect that some democratic experience is required to have politicians that are
capable of forming political business cycles.
What drives the politicians to create political business cycles?
Since the original research on political business cycles, there have been many
investigations that look at the theory and motivations that drive political business cycles.
Many of these are evaluations of the behaviour of politicians. While some studies argue
that the motivating force of politicians is simply to be re-elected, more recent studies
1

As the focus of this study is on local governments, the majority of arguments and examples provided will
revolve around local governments. However, as the theory was developed largely looking at national
governments some examples from the national level will be used. As the local level is the level of chief
concern here, when it is mentioned that politicians can influence the economy, at the local level this
refers to the local public economy.
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have argued that politicians have a utility function 2 that relies on not only their probability
of re-election, but also what their utility will be if they do not get re-elected (Baleiras &
Santos, 2000, 123). Every analysis of the motivating factors of political business cycles
concludes that politicians in democratic systems have an incentive to spend more in the
current period (that is the period before the next election). That theoretical examinations
into the issue predict that there should be empirical results is very important. In the
absence of a strong theory, empirical evidence that supports the existence of a political
business cycle would be less convincing. This is because in the absence of established
theory, alternative explanations for the existence of political business cycles may prove
more convincing. However, the theory behind political business cycles is established and
provides a strong base for empirical research into the subject. Understanding the theory
is essential to understanding empirical research. There are a number of important
factors that drive the theoretical result that politicians will engage in the creation of
political business cycles.
The most often mentioned, and easiest to understand, is that politicians will
discount the utility that they gain from the period that they spend in office after their reelection by the chances that they are re-elected (Martinez, 2009, 1175). The intuition
behind this is simple. Politicians care less about what they can do in office if they are reelected because they do not know that they will be re-elected.
The other two driving forces of the result that politicians will engage in the
creation of a political business cycle are effort smoothing and experience gained on the
job (Martinez, 2009, 1175 and 1167). The latter is important for the following reason. The
best indicator for the future performance of a politician is their past performance. Their
current performance is a better indicator than performance in the more distant past, as
2

A utility function is basically a formula that is used to measure the satisfaction level of a given person.
Utility basically equals satisfaction.
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politicians, like all employees, gain experience as they work their jobs. Thus, current
performance is a more accurate indicator of future performance than is performance in
the more distant past (Martinez, 2009, 1175). This is one of the reasons why the public
can be tricked by politicians.
The argument regarding effort smoothing is more complicated and the
implications regarding this will not be presented in detail here. However, a quick
comparison will be made between politicians seeking re-election and the motivations of
a tenure-track professor whose contract has come up for renewal, that will present some
of the implications that result from effort smoothing.
Tenure-track positions have been shown to suffer from renegotiation cycles. A
renegotiation cycle occurs when performance improves the year before the signing of a
new multi-year contract, and declines after the contract is signed. Consider a tenuretrack professor who begins with an average reputation. The optimal strategy for this
professor is to choose an intermediate level of effort early in the term of their contract.
When the renegotiation period nears the professor then observes their current
reputation. If their reputation is still average then it is optimal for them to exert more
effort. However, if their current reputation is very high or very low then a lower effort level
should be chosen (Martinez, 2009, 1167). This example shows how effort smoothing can
lead to cycles in performance.
The argument regarding consumption smoothing, while complicated, is important
as it can be used to derive the result that politicians will create political business cycles
even if they do not discount post-election utilities and if the ability of politicians does not
grow over time (Martinez, 2009, 1175). This is important as the discounting argument
may not be true of all politicians. As well, the idea that the ability of politicians develops
over time, while intuitively plausible, depends on what the functions of politicians are
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considered, and to what extent they could develop their skills with regards to those
functions.
This section provides a number of arguments why politicians would create
political business cycles. Some of the explanations revolve around selfish politicians who
wish to simply maximize their own welfare. These explanations point to a more sinister
and calculating cause of political business cycles. However, other explanations, such as
the one which argues that increased experience plays a role, are more passive in their
assertions into what drives political business cycles.
Does the economy matter to voting?
The theory behind the political business cycle entails that voters view seemingly
better economic conditions, at least their own personal economic conditions, and that
these conditions play an influential role in the determination of who the public will vote
for (Johnston, 1999, 517; Drazen, 2000, 82). The political business cycle strongly relies
on this occurring as if the public either does not notice economic conditions, or does not
vote based on them, then political business cycle theory does not make sense.
However, not only does the idea that the economy plays a role in elections intuitively
make sense as one of the main functions of government is to regulate the economy and
their performance should thus be judged at least partially on its ability to fulfill that role,
but it has been shown empirically. Many studies have confirmed the importance of
economic conditions in voting (Johnston, 1999, 517 for the Canadian context, Drazen,
2000, 82, recommends Kramer, 1971, Tufte, 1974, and Fair, 1978 for the American
context).
Political business cycle theory also relies on the fact that voters care more about
what politicians do at the end of their term (Drazen, 2000, 83). If this was not true then
election year manipulations would have less of an effect than is proposed by those who
argue that the political business cycle exists. However, the importance of recent events
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has been shown empirically (Drazen, 2000, 83, recommends Fair, 1978). This result
also intuitively makes sense as many people do not follow politics very closely on a
regular basis, but will be exposed to more political information in the period leading up to
an election.
How can voters repeatedly being tricked be rational?
One of the most common criticisms of political business cycle theory is that for it
to be true, voters must repeatedly fall for the same trick. This criticism was highly
problematic in the early stages of the development of political business cycle theory, and
remains an important issue. However, while voters repeatedly being tricked may be
perceived by some as irrational, explanations have been developed for how voters can
be repeatedly tricked, while remaining rational.
The main factor at play is information asymmetry (Baleiras & Santos, 2000, 121).
Included in this is voter’s rational ignorance (Baleiras & Santos, 2000, 121). At the local
government level, the efficient provision of basic services is a principal activity. Thus, the
notion of productivity in the public sector stresses the administrative skills of the policy
maker. A situation in which taxes are fixed or decreasing with higher levels of spending
could be seen as a sign of greater competency 3 (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 49). This is
especially true where municipal output or performance figures are hard to find. Taxes
and spending are often the best available information to the public (Veiga & Veiga, 2007,
50). Even if a member of the public wants to become informed it can be quite difficult to
do. For these reasons it is hard to blame those who base their vote on simple indicators,
for example lower taxes and more visible spending in areas that concern them.
That voters would be susceptible to manipulations in election years is also not
entirely surprising. As stated above, it seems likely that many people receive a high
proportion of their political news in election years. Also, if voters are going to examine
3

This situation is made possible by the ability to use reserves or to accumulate capital deficits.
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the government’s record en masse, this would be most likely to occur in election years.
This, combined with the argument that the best indicator of future performance is
current, not past, performance, indicates that it should not be that surprising that voters
are more susceptible to manipulations in election years.
A final factor at play in election year fiscal manipulations is transfers to specific
groups or constituencies (Drazen, 2000, 101). This kind of politics, while potentially
being seen as politicians satisfying their constituencies, is also akin to bribery if the
motivation of the politician is purely re-election. However, there is reason to suspect that
election year manipulation of this kind occurs, either as a result of increased focus on
politics and what can be gained on the part of constituencies, or by increased focus on
constituencies by politicians.
There are a number of reasons that have been presented which show that voters
can be rational, while still falling victim to the same manipulations over and over again.
Most of the explanations revolve around the fact that voters do not have useful
information on who they are voting for, and as a result are forced to use indicators that
are easily manipulated.
Additional theoretical issues
While most of the above has argued that there are many factors that are enabling
political business cycles to be created, there are some factors that limit the scope or size
of political business cycles. First, these manipulations are not expected in every locality
for every election. Indeed, there are potential costs for a politician creating a political
business cycle. These costs involve either being caught directly manipulating the
economy for one’s own personal gain (certainly not a good situation for any politician), or
manipulating the economy in a harmful way so that one develops a reputation as a bad
manager of the economy (also a bad situation for any politician to be in). Thus, there
exist costs to enacting policies that will create political business cycles (Schultz, 1995,

14
85). It can therefore be expected that only politicians in close races will choose to
attempt to opportunistically manipulate the economy (Schultz, 1995, 87). This can lead
to issues in attempting to empirically find a political business cycle. The relationship
between election years, taxes, and expenditures may rely on whether the election will be
closely fought.
If this is true, then whether or not an election will be close must be known far in
advance of the election. Whether or not an election will be close is not always known far
in advance, and some of the policies that are used to create political business cycles
must be enacted well in advance of an election. This implies that either politicians who
are not completely sure of their positions may attempt to create a political business
cycle, or that many politicians will not know whether or not they will be popular and so
refrain from opportunistic tactics.
Another issue with political business cycles is that they involve both lowering
taxes and raising spending before an election, and raising taxes and lowering spending
after an election to offset the cost of the opportunistic policies. However, creating
spending and lowering taxes is usually more politically acceptable then eliminating
spending and raising taxes, both of which can alienate some of the electorate (Schultz,
1995, 87).
There is another way in which political business cycles may operate. It is
possible that taxes are lowered and expenditures are raised in election years, and that
there is no corresponding increase or decrease after the elections. In the absence of
countering effects in non-election years, the long-run effect of this type of political
business cycle would be increased spending and lower taxes.
A final note is that a number of other factors have been suggested as affecting
the relationship between elections, spending, and taxes. Whether or not the incumbent
candidate is running for re-election should change their motivations; however the
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empirics of this are less clear then would be imagined (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 63). As
well, ideology has been suggested as having an effect on how opportunistic politicians
seek to gain electoral advantage. Specifically it is suggested that left-wing incumbents
have greater incentives to create political business cycles (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 63),
although again the empirics of this are debatable.
Literature Review (Empirics)
Many studies have been performed that attempt to analyse whether there is
empirical support for the political business cycle. These studies have been performed
across and within nations, over all levels of government. The results of these empirical
analyses are highly mixed. A number of previous findings will be discussed to give some
context to the present research that will then be discussed.
One recent and particularly well developed study was conducted by Veiga &
Veiga (2007). They found that there was clear evidence of rational opportunistic
behaviour by mayors in Portugal over the time period of 1979-2001. This included a
10.5% decrease in taxes in election years and a 4% increase in total expenditures, with
an 8.2% rise in investment expenditures. As well, it was concluded that left-wing mayors
were more opportunistic. The dependent variables analysed were budget balances, total
municipal taxes per capita, and real per capita expenditures broken down into a number
of sub-groupings. The explanatory variables were lagged values of the dependent
variables, total real per capita transfers, an election year dummy variable, and an
ideological dummy variable. The controlling factors were the percentage of the
population under 15 and over 65, population density, a dummy variable that deals with
proximity to the coastline, and a population category that dealt with city size. This study
and its methodology form the basis for this research, however, it had to be tweaked in
quite a number of ways to make it more applicable to the Ontario case. A related study
by Coelho, Veiga, & Veiga (2006) found employment increases in election years and
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pre-election years relative to others. That the mayor was running for re-election was
crucial to the result. These studies point out a number of factors recognized in the theory
behind political business cycle, notably that running for re-election can be significant. As
well, that the result was obtained that political business cycles existed is consistent with
other results which indicate that they are more likely to exist in newer democracies. 4
Akhemedov & Zhuravskaya (2004) find that pre-electoral manipulation increased
the chance of re-election in Russia. As well, Sakurai & Menezes-Filho (2008) find that
higher spending leads to greater chances of re-election in Brazil, as did higher
opportunistic spending. Gonzalez (1999b) surveys 43 countries and finds that political
business cycles affect countries with intermediate levels of democracy most (Drazen,
2000, 98). Shi and Svensson (2000) examine 123 countries and come to the conclusion
that political business cycles are especially strong in developing countries (Drazen,
2000, 98).
Blais & Nadeau (1992) examined Canadian provinces from 1951-84 and found
evidence for a short-electoral cycle, only in the year before elections (that is there is no
corresponding tax increase in the year after elections), and mainly in social services and
roads (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 48).
In his seminal article on the issue, Nordhaus (1975) finds empirical evidence for
political business cycles at the federal level in Germany, New Zealand, and the United
States, while not finding any evidence with regards to Canada, Japan, Australia, and
New Zealand. He also finds modest evidence for political business cycles in France and
Sweden.
Ginsburgh & Michel (1983) argue that political business cycles are more likely to
occur where there are fixed election dates, and that they are more likely to be detected
with fixed election dates. The endogenous nature of non-fixed elections not only reduces
4

Portugal had been governed by a military-civilian provisional administration as recently as 1976.
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the incentives that politicians have to engage in the creation of political business cycles,
it also makes detecting political business cycles where they do exist more difficult.
Drazen (2000) is highly critical of models that rely solely on monetary policy explanations
and finds that fiscal policy is a more informative avenue for study. Schultz (1995)
confirms that governments who are far ahead in the polls will not engage in manipulation
while those in close races are more likely to do so.
The preceding section has highlighted some of the empirical research into
political business cycles. However, this section has focused on research that has
resulted in findings of political business cycles. The purpose of this was to illustrate what
can be looked for, and what has been successfully found regarding the political business
cycle. This section should not mislead any readers into thinking that most research into
political business cycles finds associations between relevant variables and election
years, as this is certainly not the case.
In summation, the state of the research is mixed. There is a solid theoretical
foundation for research on political business cycles that suggests valid reasons why they
might occur and what that process might operate like. However, empirical results have
been mixed with results coming from developing countries being more likely to have
found evidence of political business cycles.
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Chapter Three - Research Design
The research design of this project will be adapted from that of the Veiga & Veiga
(2007) study to suit the Ontario municipal context. As well, the scale of the project was
reduced to accommodate the data available, as well as the research capacity of those
involved with the project.
Why study Ontario municipal government?
There are a number of features of municipal government which make the study
of political business cycles uniquely suitable to that level of government. Where
municipalities are forced to or choose to record financial information in detail and make
that information available to the public, there exists data that cannot be found at other
levels of government. This is because the institutional structure and policy instruments
available at the municipal level are constant across regions or countries. As well, the
number of localities within a given region provides many cases to compare (Veiga &
Veiga, 2007, 46).
For example, to study municipalities within Ontario, there exist data sets that
include 444 municipalities. In contrast, there exist only 10 provinces in Canada which
could be studied. The analysis could be extended across countries, for example studying
Canadian provinces and American states. However the institutional structure and policy
instruments available to provinces are different from those available to states and this
can lead to issues in analysis.
Ontario municipalities also have fixed election dates. The presence of fixed
election dates increases both the chances of political business cycles occurring, as well
as the chances of research detecting political business cycles (Ginsburgh & Michel,
1983, 156). Fixed election dates have this effect because they make politicians certain
that an election will occur at a given time. This means that if they wish to enact policies

19
that will result in a political business cycle, then they can do so knowing exactly when
they must enact those policies to achieve the desired result. The vagueness associated
with non-fixed election dates injects uncertainty into the process which diminishes the
returns that a given politician could expect from policies that cause a political business
cycle. Similarly, the endogenous nature of non-fixed election dates injects more
uncertainty into the empirical study of political business cycles (Ginsburgh & Michel,
1983, 156).
Canada is a democracy, and all levels of government within Canada have
democratic elections. Ontario municipalities, like most around the world, promote social
and economic development by organizing and supplying public goods. Also importantly,
municipalities are financially autonomous. They have their own employees and assets,
and they define their local budget. However, Ontario’s municipalities are not completely
autonomous. They are creations of the Ontario government and are subject to many
rules and regulations that are imposed upon them. This can limit their access to revenue
as well as their expenditure choices. However, on the whole Ontario’s municipalities are
fairly autonomous and there certainly exists the potential for political business cycles to
be created within them (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 48, sets out similar criteria for Portuguese
municipalities).
Hypotheses
The research question that this project seeks to answer is: Is there a political
business cycle in Ontario municipalities? Stemming from this as well as the theory
above, a number of hypotheses have been developed that will be tested. The main
hypothesis is that taxes, capital spending, and municipal employment will be significantly
related to election year.
It must be noted that the relationship, while significant, is not hypothesized to be
extremely significant, and in fact there were many reasons to suspect that the results
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obtained by this study may not be significant at all. As stated previously, the expectation
with political business cycles is not that they will occur in every municipality for every
election. As such, the relationship that is being searched for is not one that will hold in all
cases. This can lead to issues in finding empirical results that support a political
business cycle.
Hypotheses can be made not just on whether or not there will be a relationship
between the variables named and election year, but also what direction that relationship
will be in. It is hypothesized that taxes will be negatively related to election year. Political
business cycle theory proposes that politicians allow for lower taxes relative to other
years in election years to build support amongst the public.
It is hypothesized that capital expenditures and municipal employment will be
positively related with election year. For employment this relationship is also
hypothesized for the year before elections. The theory behind this hypothesis is that
capital expenditures and employment, particularly in highly visible areas, will go up in
election years as politicians attempt to make themselves appear more competent or as
politicians support key constituencies.
Methodology
The top 70 municipalities in Ontario by population excluding upper-tier entities
were studied. This accounts for roughly all of the municipalities that are over 20,000 in
population. This sample was chosen for a number of reasons.
Firstly, there are reasons to suspect that the politics of small municipalities will be
substantially different from that of larger municipalities. One way in which this is the case
is that in smaller municipalities one large expenditure item might lead to a large variation
in expenditures. Secondly, this sample size was chosen to allow for the research to take
place in a timely fashion. Finally, this sample size represents over 15% of the total
municipal population. While this is not a large percentage of the municipal population,
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these municipalities do make up a large percentage of the total Ontario population. In
the year 2006, the top 70 municipalities in Ontario by population contained 10,426,724
people. This represents over 82 percent of the 12,665,300 people in Ontario (Statistics
Canada, 2009).
This represents a reasonable sample size. Also, for statistical purposes with a
population size of 500, to achieve analysis with a confidence level of 95% 19 times out
of 20, a sample size of 78 is required (O`Sullivan, Rassel, & Berner, 2008, 171). The
sample selected is large enough for meaningful statistical analysis to be conducted, and
did not result in numerous delays as might have occurred with a larger sample size.
The following data was collected for the top 70 lower or single-tier municipalities
by population for the years 2000 to 2006 5: total municipal employment, including subsections for full-time, part-time, and seasonal; total own purpose lower-tier taxation;
capital expenditures including sub-sections for protection services, recreation and
culture, transportation, and planning and development; provincial unconditional grants,
provincial conditional grants, and federal conditional grants; population density; the
percentage of people under age 15 and over age 65; and Ontario unemployment and
employment rates. All financial data and employment data were converted into per
capita measures. As well, all financial information was converted into real figures using
the base-year 2000, using an inflation calculator made available by the Bank of Canada
(Bank of Canada, 2010). Annual percentage changes were also calculated for all
variables where possible.
All data was obtained from the Ontario Financial Information Return / Municipal
Performance Measurement Program website, with the exception of the percentages of
population under 15 and over 65, as well as population density which were obtained
from Statistics Canada community profiles. As these were only available for census
5

For reasons as to why certain variables were selected, see the section entitled “Measurement.”
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years, the 2006 figures were used as they are most recent and relevant to this research.
The Ontario employment percentages were obtained from Human Resources and Skills
Development Canada. With the exception of the Statistics Canada data, all data was
gathered where available for all of the relevant years.
The time frame was chosen for a number of reasons. The Ontario Financial
Information Return / Municipal Performance Measurement Program data that was so
crucial to this project is available starting for the year 2000. The year 2006 was chosen
as an end date as when the project was initially designed that was the last election year
for which there was data. This time frame contains three election years (2000, 2003,
2006) and four non-election years (2001, 2002, 2004, 2005). This gives adequate data
on numerous election and non-election years, and makes sure that data from one year is
not being given a disproportionate amount of weight as could be possible if only one
election year was chosen. As well, similarly to why the top 70 municipalities by
population were chosen as the sample, the years selected allowed for data collection to
proceed in a timely fashion and the sample size was deemed large enough to conduct
meaningful statistical analysis.
Measurement
The following regressions are used in this analysis:
Real own purpose lower-tier taxation per capita = Election year + Real Canada
conditional grants per capita + Real Ontario unconditional grants per capita + Real
Ontario conditional grants per capita + population density + % population over 65 +
% population under 15
Real capital expenditures per capita = Election year + Real Canada conditional grants
per capita + Real Ontario unconditional grants per capita + Real Ontario
conditional grants per capita + population density + % population over 65 + %
population under 15
Real capital expenditures per capita: recreation and culture = Election year + Real
Canada conditional grants per capita + Real Ontario unconditional grants per
capita + Real Ontario conditional grants per capita + population density + %
population over 65 + % population under 15

23
Real capital expenditures per capita: planning and development = Election year + Real
Canada conditional grants per capita + Real Ontario unconditional grants per
capita + Real Ontario conditional grants per capita + population density + %
population over 65 + % population under 15
Real capital expenditures per capita: transportation = Election year + Real Canada
conditional grants per capita + Real Ontario unconditional grants per capita + Real
Ontario conditional grants per capita + population density + % population over 65 +
% population under 15
Real capital expenditures per capita: protection = Election year + Real Canada
conditional grants per capita + Real Ontario unconditional grants per capita + Real
Ontario conditional grants per capita + population density + % population over 65 +
% population under 15
Municipal employment per capita = Election year + Year before election year +
population density + % population over 65 + % population under 15 + Ontario
unemployment rate
Municipal employment per capita: part-time = Election year + Year before election year +
population density + % population over 65 + % population under 15 + Ontario
unemployment rate
Municipal employment per capita: seasonal = Election year + Year before election year +
population density + % population over 65 + % population under 15 + Ontario
unemployment rate
The above regressions will allow for all of the proposed hypotheses to be tested.
The reasons for choosing the variables that were chosen will now be given.
For the taxation variable, real own purpose lower-tier taxation per capita was
chosen for a number of reasons. Alternative variables include total taxation not strictly at
the lower-tier level or for own purposes, or municipal residential tax rate. The total
taxation variable was not chosen as this could lead to debate as to which tier of
government was responsible for the tax, and to what extent local councillors would be
able to change the tax if they wanted to. These confounding factors would make the
analysis less clear. Using own purpose and lower-tier taxation only, the chances that
local politicians will be able to control these variables, and thus create a political
business cycle is raised. Municipal tax rates were not chosen as a variable as the tax
rates depend crucially on the assessment values of property within the municipality. As
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this research is not intending to examine any effects that are caused by changes in
assessed values of property this variable did not seem reasonable. As well, it seems
legitimate to assume that local voters care more about the actual amount of property tax
that they are paying rather than the exact rate which they are paying.
Real capital expenditures per capita are being examined as political business
cycle theory predicts that politicians will spend additional funds in areas where high
amounts of variation are more possible, and in highly visible areas (Veiga & Veiga, 2007,
48). Thus, operating expenditures are not an item that political business cycle theory
predicts will be manipulated by politicians leading up to elections (Veiga & Veiga, 2007,
50; Beleiras & da Silva Costa, 2004, 657). The reasons for this have been touched on
but are worth repeating. Operation expenditures are largely composed of things like
salaries which are governed by unionized labour contracts which are exceedingly difficult
to change or manipulate (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 50; Beleiras & da Silva Costa, 2004,
657). As well, many operational expenses could not be classified as visible
expenditures. A final note on operational expenditures is that they must be paid for in the
time period in which they are consumed. This is not true of capital expenditures and is
yet another reason why capital expenditures are easier to manipulate.
Capital expenditures as a whole are considered to be more variable and more
visible than operational expenditures (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 50). As well, with all capital
expenditures the possibility exists that the expenditure is being made to satisfy a specific
constituency. As discussed above, if these expenditures are made by politicians strictly
because they wish to keep their jobs then these expenditures would be akin to bribery.
Political business cycle theory predicts that capital expenditures may be manipulated by
politicians as elections grow closer.
While capital expenditures as a whole could be expected to be manipulated,
there are many capital expenditures which could not be considered visible. For this
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reason the capital expenditure variable has been disaggregated into several subcategories which provide more specific measures for testing the existence of political
business cycles. These sub-categories are recreation and culture, planning and
development, transportation, and protection.
Capital expenditures in protection would be visible in a municipality where crime
was to be a large election issue. As this analysis examines the larger municipalities in
Ontario and as crime is often perceived to be a problem in urban areas, expenditures on
protection could be considered visible. Planning and development, as well as
transportation, are visible expenditures because citizens inevitably run into these capital
projects in their daily life in a municipality. Construction tends to be highly visible,
especially to people who have long commutes or live in highly urban areas (Spafford,
1981, 135). Finally, recreation and cultural expenses allow for politicians to satisfy
certain constituencies in highly visible ways. For these reasons, these variables are
important to examine in the context of political business cycles.
There is evidence political business cycles are possible in municipal employment
(Coelho, Veiga, & Veiga, 2006, 86). For this reason it was important to study the
employment variables. While it is possible that total municipal employment would
change, it seemed more likely that part-time or seasonal employment would be easier to
manipulate. This is due to the restrictive union contracts that municipalities face. As
more variation is expected in part-time and seasonal employees, these variables were
important to study.
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Chapter Four - Results
Linear regressions were performed on all of the data mentioned above. The
results indicate that the hypotheses are partially confirmed. For most variables the
regression coefficient was the expected sign; however, in most cases the results were
not significant at the 5% level. For theories on why the following results were obtained
see the chapter entitled “Analysis.”
Before the results of the regressions are discussed, a cursory examination of the
data pulled a number of interesting issues that seem to point towards the existence of
political business cycles. 27 of the 30 largest negative annual changes in real own
purpose taxation occurred in 2006. Five of the 30 largest positive changes in this
variable occurred in election years. Of the 30 largest positive changes in capital
expenditures, 15 occurred in election years. However, of the 30 largest negative
changes in that variable, 10 occurred in election years. Of the 30 largest values for parttime municipal employees, 22 come from years before election years. 20 of the top 30
values for seasonal employment also come from years before election years.
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Table One: Summary of Regression Results
Variable (all
real and per
capita, where
applicable)
Own purpose
lower-tier
taxation
Capital
expenditure
Transportation
capital
expenditure
Recreation and
culture capital
expenditure
Protection
services
capital
expenditure
Planning and
development
capital
expenditure
Employment Total
EmploymentPart-time
EmploymentSeasonal

6

Adj.
2
R

Election
year
coefficient

t-value:
election
year

-23.842

Year
before
election
coefficient
N/A

Sig.:
election
year

-1.603

t-value:
year
before
election
N/A

.11

Sig.:
year
before
elec.
N/A

.607

.140

8.795

N/A

.565

N/A

.573

N/A

.104

7.798

N/A

1.432

N/A

.153

N/A

.059

6.116

N/A

.840

N/A

.401

N/A

.035

1.869

N/A

1.205

N/A

.229

N/A

.025

-0.727

N/A

-.268

N/A

.789

N/A

.245

See
6
appendix
See
appendix
See
appendix

See
appendix
See
appendix
See
appendix

-.738

.443

.461

.658

-2.761

4.613

.006

.000

-3.046

2.033

.002

.043

.232
.114

For coefficients for the employment regressions, consult the more detailed results in the appendices.
The figures are very small and would require more space for decimal places.
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Table Two: Descriptive Statistics

N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

REALTAX/CP

486

165

1271

593.28

254.133

REALCAPEXP

486

49.9460

1308.6866

325.402778

180.0667567

REALPROCAP

486

.0000

159.7855

16.644511

16.4092202

REALPLANDEVEL/CP

486

-.5586

286.1657

14.631258

28.3126908

REALTRANSCAP/CP

486

-3.2519

450.0945

101.395780

60.2234324

REALRECCULTURECAP

486

2.29066

685.66119

65.1211952

77.40048994

EMP/CAP

478

.00363

.03500

.0132638

.00596681

PARTTIMECAP

486

.0000

.0180

.003721

.0034497

SEASONALCAP

486

.0000

.0150

.001868

.0022228

Valid N (listwise)

478

The regression that examined the real own purpose lower-tier taxation per capita
had the highest explanatory value of any of the regressions that were conducted. The
adjusted R-squared value of .607 shows that the explanatory and control variables were
relatively powerful in explaining variation in the tax variable. The regression coefficient
associated with the election year dummy variable was -23.842. This suggests that real
own purpose lower-tier taxation per capita is over $23 lower in election years. This
corresponds to a t-value of 1.603 and is significant at the 11% level. With the exception
of the regressions featuring employment variables as dependent, this is the highest
degree of significance recorded for an explanatory variable in any of the regressions.
While this result is not statistically significant at the standard 5% level, it is interesting for
a number of reasons which will be discussed further in the analysis chapter.
The results from the regressions on capital variables held less explanatory power
than the regression regarding taxes. However, the results are still interesting. With
respect to the regression on total real capital expenditures per capita, the adjusted R-
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squared value was .14. The regression coefficient associated with the election year
dummy variable was 8.795. This implies that in election years over $8 per person more
is spent compared to other years. This corresponds to a t-value of 0.565, and is not
statistically significant. However, the regression coefficient is in the right direction.
The regression on real transportation capital expenditures per capita had an
adjusted R-squared of .104. The election year coefficient was 7.798, implying that
almost $8 per person more is spent in election years compared to other years. This
corresponds to a t-value of 1.432 and is significant at the 16% level. While not
statistically significant, the regression coefficient is again in the hypothesized direction
and there does appear to be some association that would be surprising if arising out of
coincidence or bias.
The regression on real recreation and culture capital expenditures per capita had
an adjusted R-squared of .059. The election year coefficient was 6.116 which
corresponds to a t-value of .84. This is not statistically significant, however, the
regression coefficient is yet again in the hypothesized direction.
The regression on real protection capital expenditures per capita had an adjusted
R-squared of .035. The election year coefficient was 1.869 which corresponds to a tvalue of 1.205 and is significant at the 23% level. While not being statistically significant
the regression coefficient is indeed in the hypothesized direction.
The regression on real planning and development capital expenditures per capita
had an adjusted R-squared of .025. The election year coefficient was -0.727 which
corresponds to a t-value of -0.268. This is not statistically significant and the regression
coefficient is not in the hypothesized direction, although it is only slightly negative.
The regressions on employment variables hold more explanatory value than the
regressions on capital expenditure variables. As well, generally the results hold more
statistical significance. Regression coefficients will not be reported for employment
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variables. They are all incredibly small as municipal employment per capita figures are
minute to begin with.
With respect to the regression on total municipal employment per capita the
adjusted R-squared was .245. The t-value for the election year coefficient is -0.738. This
is not in the hypothesized direction and is not significant. The t-value for the year before
election dummy variable was 0.443. This is in the hypothesized direction and is not
significant.
The regression on part-time municipal employment per capita had an adjusted Rsquared of .232. The t-value for the election year variable was -2.761. This is not in the
hypothesized direction and is significant at the 1% level. The t-value for the year before
election year variable was 4.613. This is in the hypothesized direction and is significant
at the 1% level.
The regression on seasonal municipal employment per capita had an adjusted Rsquared of .114. The t-value for the election year variable was -3.046. This is not in the
hypothesized direction and is significant at the 1% level. The t-value for the year before
election year variable was 2.033. This is in the hypothesized direction and is significant
at the 5% level.
The results from the municipal employment regressions were not as anticipated.
However, they do feature an interesting result that, while not being initially hypothesized,
can potentially be explained given other results.
In summary, the regression coefficients for the election year variable were in the
hypothesized direction for every variable with the exception of all of the employment
variables, as well as real planning and development capital expenditures per capita.
Interestingly, the hypothesized result was confirmed for the employment variables with
respect to the year before election variable.
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A final interesting result concerns the correlation between real own purpose
lower-tier taxation per capita and real capital expenditures per capita. These two
variables have a Pearson correlation coefficient of .467. This correlation is positive which
implies that these variables move in the same direction. As well, this correlation is
significant at the 1% level. Of the 30 largest decreases in real own purpose lower-tier
taxation per capita (as stated 27 of which occurred in 2006 an election year), 17 cases
had real capital expenditures per capita also falling while 13 had that variable increasing.
Most of these results were not statistically significant, although some were
substantially more significant than others. The most significant non-employment factor
was real own purpose lower-tier taxation per capita. This regression also had by far the
highest adjusted R-squared on any of the regressions. However, some of the
regressions on the employment variables led to findings which are significant at the 1%
level. These results provide an ample amount of information to be analysed.
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Chapter Five - Limitations
There are a number of issues that may be a threat to the validity of this research
and limit the ability for generalizations to be made across the Ontario sample and to
outside of this sample.
Causal issues are always an issue with any research. Correlations can be made,
but it is always difficult to say with certainty that one thing leads to another. The study of
political business cycles is no exception to this issue. As governments do not have
perfect control over the economy, other factors may be driving the result. The limited
understanding by politicians of economic problems and the lags in their ability to control
the economy lead to scepticism by some that politicians could even create a political
business cycle (Ginsburgh & Michel, 1983, 156). However, there exist no other
explanations that would justify a systemic lowering of taxes by municipalities in election
years, nor do explanations exist for higher capital spending or employment. Until an
alternative explanation is given as to why these variables would systematically shift
according to whether it is an election year or not, it should be believed that the election
year is causing the politicians to make these choices if this result is found empirically.
The selection of the sample may lead to some issues in bias. It is possible that
by leaving out small municipalities the selection may be biased in some way. However,
as generalizations will not be made regarding small municipalities this is not an issue.
Similarly, while the research at hand indicates what the case is for Ontario in the given
years, generalizations outside of Ontario and the given years may not be entirely
accurate. However, the results of this research will be applicable to the Ontario case
unless something changes that would give reason to believe the situation faced by
Ontario municipal politicians has been made substantially different.
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Maturation might be an issue within the selected sample. For instance, the
Ontario ranges of fairness that limit increases to residential taxes may lead to more
decreases in at least residential tax rates, and might be having an effect on own purpose
lower-tier taxation that is biasing the numbers. However, this research examines total,
not residential, taxes. Unless a valid reason is suggested, there appears no reason why
this data should be biased in any way by natural changes occurring within Ontario’s
municipalities.
There were a number of amalgamations or mergers that occurred in the sample
over the relevant time period. While this has the potential to lead to issues of
experimental mortality, the data was analysed in a way which did not present an issue
for this research.
Issues with instrumentation may be possible if municipalities were not recording
data in a consistent way. However, there are no large issues with respect to this that
have come to attention.
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Chapter Six - Analysis
The results obtained in the course of this research project suggest that there is
some evidence for the existence of political business cycles in Ontario municipalities.
Before the results of the regressions are analyzed, the results of the initial data
examination will be discussed.
Of the 30 largest negative annual changes in real own purpose lower-tier taxation
per capita, 27 are from 2006. This indicates one of two things. It is possible that this
indicates that the political business cycle exists as it appears that municipalities are
lowering the amount of taxes that they are collecting for their own purposes in election
years. However, the fact that 27 out of 30 are from one particular election year may
indicate that there is some systemic change that led to many municipalities taking the
same action in this year which just happened to be an election year. If this is the case
then this systemic change may be driving the result that real own purpose lower-tier
taxation per capita seems to be an important variable. Exactly what is going on here is
not known, however, it certainly warranted mention.
Of the 30 largest positive changes in real own purpose lower-tier taxation per
capita, only five are from election years. As two of the six years for which change data is
available studied are election years, this value would have been expected to be 10 in the
absence of a political business cycle. This result, combined with the result that the vast
majority of the 30 largest negative changes come from election years, indicates that
political business cycles seem to be occurring.
Of the 30 largest values for part-time municipal employees, 22 come from years
before election years. Similarly for seasonal municipal employees, 20 of the top 30
values come from years before election years. As only two of the seven years sampled
are years before election years, the expected values would have been roughly 8.5 in the
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absence of a political business cycle. This seems to indicate that something is occurring
in the year before elections with regards to employment. However, as stated above the
idea that politicians would try to strategically enhance their image in anticipation of a
close election two years in the future is not an intuitively plausible scenario. The
explanation that election year employment is kept artificially low to keep taxes low
seems to make some intuitive sense. However, that explanation has little to say about
why employment would be high in the year before elections. While the low employment
in election years would make employment seem high in all other years, it should not
have as drastic an effect on the year before elections as is being seen in the data.
The regression coefficients were in the hypothesized direction in all cases with
the exception of the employment variables and real planning and development capital
expenditures per capita. The regression coefficient in the latter case was only slightly
negative and not significant. As well, this regression had the lowest explanatory power of
any of the regressions conducted. Thus, it seems safe to assume that those who wish to
create a political business cycle do not attempt to manipulate planning and development
in any substantial way, at least in the Ontario case. This result is interesting as it
contradicts previous research findings.
Capital infrastructure projects such as roads and overpasses have been
suggested as highly visible expenditures which are likely to be manipulated by politicians
who wish to create a political business cycle for their own advantage (Veiga & Veiga,
2007, 46). However, the results of this research indicate that transportation capital
expenditure 7 per capita is not significantly related to election years. However, there does
appear to be some relationship and it is in the hypothesized direction. This weakly
confirms the result that capital expenditures in highly visible areas are the most affected.
However, this result is not as strong as it has been in previous studies. There are a
7

Transportation capital expenditures is the variable that would contain things such as roadways, etc.
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number of reasons why this could be possible. It could be that the type of expenditures
that are considered visible, or that are seen as positive by the public is different from
place to place. Thus, it could be that in Portugal citizens see investment in roads and
infrastructure as essential or valuable, whereas Ontario citizens see capital projects that
have to do with infrastructure as causing excessive traffic problems and as a less
valuable use of public funds. This is just a possible example; however the point is that
what is considered visible and positive by the public likely changes in different contexts.
The fact that the regressions on employment variables led to the conclusion that
municipal employment goes down in election years was surprising given the theory
behind the political business cycle. However, a number of theories help to understand
what might be driving this result. Crucial to the idea that there is a political business
cycle is that employment was higher the year before elections. The result that real own
purpose lower-tier taxation per capita was down in election years might also help to
explain the result with respect to employment in election years.
In election years if taxes are being manipulated to be artificially low, and capital
expenditures are increasing slightly, these funds must come from somewhere. Cuts to
employment or less hiring relative to other years could potentially be a tactic used by
some politicians to help to contain costs in election years. As well, the fact that all types
of employment are up in the year before elections implies that it is possible that
politicians attempt to gain favour through higher employment the year before elections.
However, there are some issues with parts of this explanation. It seems unlikely that a
politician would know two years before an election in what state they would be regarded
by the public come election time. The idea that political business cycles are started two
years in advance by politicians who can predict what their situation will be like in the
future is not an intuitively plausible scenario. However, this does not alter the first part of
this argument which is that it appears that employment may be manipulated in Ontario
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municipalities in election years, however the manipulation was different than originally
hypothesized. It may be the case that employment is kept suppressed in election years
and that this corresponds with artificially low real own purpose lower-tier taxation per
capita.
While most of the regression coefficients are in the hypothesized direction, some
explanations for how political business cycles are created are more believable given the
data. As stated it certainly appears that real own purpose lower-tier taxation per capita is
lower than would be expected in election years. The relative power of this regression
and relative significance of the election year coefficient seem to confirm the theory that
taxes are manipulated in election years in some places. The regression coefficient for
election years is only significant at the 11% level. While this certainly is not proof that
there is a political business cycle, it would be surprising to obtain this result out of sheer
chance. As well, the theory of the political business cycle does not imply that election
year manipulations will take place in every municipality in every election. This has been
suggested as a reason why the political business cycle has been hard to empirically
isolate. The regressions conducted for this research did not control for factors such as
the closeness of the elections or whether or not incumbents were running for re-election.
Political business cycle theory argues that having incumbents running for re-re-election
in competitive races may be necessary to find evidence of a political business cycle. The
reasons for this were mentioned in the initial exploration of political business cycle,
however they bear re-mentioning.
While policies that result in a political business cycle supposedly give some
benefit to those that enact them, that benefit may be countered by a cost. If one is seen
to be manipulating the economy for their own purposes this could lead to negative
reactions by the public regarding that candidate (Schultz, 1995, 85). As politicians face
decreasing returns to scale on the amount of votes that they get, this implies that the
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incentive for politicians who are doing better in the polls to engage in the creation of a
political business cycle is smaller than for those who face competitive races (Schultz,
1995, 87). As well, if the incumbent politician is not running for re-election then the
incentives to engage in the creation of a political business cycle are also quite different
and these politicians should be less likely to lead to the creation of a political business
cycle. For these reasons it is not expected that every municipality will have a political
business cycle for every election year. Whether or not one is created depends on the
interplay of many factors. This is why it should not be expected that extremely strong
results will be obtained when looking for political business cycles.
The correlation between real own purpose lower-tier taxation per capita and real
capital expenditures per capita should not be surprising as less taxation revenues imply
less funds to spend on capital projects. Similarly, more taxation revenues imply more
funds to spend on capital projects. However, political business cycle theory predicts that
politicians who wish to appear more competent will lower taxes and raise capital
expenditures in election years. However, the fact that these two variables are highly
correlated implies that this may not be the case. As well, of the 30 largest annual
decreases in real own purpose lower-tier taxation per capita (of which 27 were from
2006 an election year), real capital expenditures per capita were falling in 17 of those
cases and rising in 13. This indicates an interesting result. Is seems as if politicians may
strategically choose to affect either taxation or capital spending, depending on which will
be considered more visible or positive by the public. It is possible that a politician who
was seen to be decreasing taxes while engaging in a large amount of spending would be
regarded as an irresponsible manager of the local public economy. Thus, politicians may
choose to affect one variable or the other, however maybe not both at once.
This result may seem to be unsupportive of the finding of a political business
cycle. However, the fact that real own purpose lower-tier taxation per capita is lower in
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election years compared to other years and that capital expenditures are higher in
election years, despite the fact that these two variables are highly correlated is a
surprising result, and one which seems to indicate the presence of a political business
cycle.
Some who read this may wish for certain specific cases to be mentioned as
possible municipalities where political business cycles were created. However, as stated
above it can be difficult to imply causation from statistical analysis and to do so with a
cursory look at data alone would be irresponsible. There certainly are cases where taxes
are going down and capital expenditures are going up in election years. While cases
where these values are going in different directions at magnitudes that could be
considered irresponsible could be mentioned, to do so without more knowledge of each
situation and exactly what the underlying causes were would be irresponsible. However,
while this is the case, the results obtained from this study indicate that taxes are lower in
election years compared to other years and capital expenditures are higher in election
years. Without need to analyse specific cases, the results obtained in this research
would be surprising if obtained by chance and there is an indication of political business
cycles in Ontario municipalities.
All of the above analysis indicates that there is some evidence for political
business cycles in Ontario municipalities from 2000 to 2006. While the results are not
statistically significant in most cases, the results seem to point in the direction of political
business cycles occurring. As has been mentioned, the fact that this result is not overly
strong or statistically significant should not be taken to mean that political business
cycles are not occurring. Indeed, political business cycle theory would suggest that
empirically it is difficult to find.
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Chapter Seven - Implications for Theory
This study provides weak support for the existence of political business cycles in
Ontario municipalities. This conclusion makes sense given the research that has come
before it. Political business cycles are more likely to exist in younger democracies, and
are not expected to occur in every municipality in every election. Thus weakly confirming
the existence of political business cycles would seem to make theoretical sense.
Future empirical research should focus on isolating exactly in what situations
political business cycles can be expected, and in what situations they will not be
expected. As has been stated previously, the current argument is that close elections
with incumbents running for re-election are situations where political business cycles are
most likely. However, the extent to which politicians know much in advance of elections
whether they will be competitive and whether they will be running again is unclear. While
these variables may be helpful in determining the likelihood of political business cycles,
this is most likely not the entire explanation.
Future theoretical research should focus on a problem that revolves around the
budget constraint that many theoretical examinations of political business cycles use. In
many cases a standard two period budget constraint of a set value is used (Baleiras &
Santos, 2000, 123). However, the person who is said to face that budget constraint
actually has the power to change the budget constraint. A set budget constraint may not
be the most realistic budget constraint facing politicians. It is likely that an endogenous
budget constraint would greatly complicate these models and that the results may very
well be the same. Nevertheless, an endogenous budget constraint would be a more
realistic depiction of the situation actually facing politicians who must make decisions of
whether or not to engage in the creation of a political business cycle.

41

Chapter Eight - Conclusion
This essay began with an outline of the current state of political business cycle
research. Following this a research model was set up, and the results of that research
were reported. It appears that there is some evidence to support the notion that political
business cycles do exist in Ontario municipalities. A number of directions for future
theoretical and empirical research have also been suggested. Political business cycles
affect democracy and the legitimacy that our democratic institutions hold. The legitimacy
of our democratic institutions is essential to their proper functioning. Political business
cycles are something that should be taken seriously, despite the fact that it can be
difficult to come up with strong empirical results regarding their existence.
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Appendix
Regression – Real own purpose lower-tier taxation per capita

Model Summary

Model
1

R

R Square
a

.783

Adjusted R

Std. Error of

Square

the Estimate

.613

.607

156.862

a. Predictors: (Constant), Popo65, Election Year,
REALCANCOND, Densqkm, REALONTUNCOND,
REALONTCOND, Popu15

Coefficients

a

Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B
(Constant)

Std. Error

50.843

205.748

-23.842

14.877

REALCANCOND

2.994

REALONTUNCOND

Coefficients
Beta

t

Sig.
.247

.805

-.047

-1.603

.110

.580

.201

5.165

.000

-.339

.148

-.118

-2.286

.023

REALONTCOND

.718

.068

.613

10.620

.000

Densqkm

.033

.012

.095

2.751

.006

Popu15

823.170

770.917

.071

1.068

.286

Popo65

1991.128

475.786

.272

4.185

.000

Election Year

a. Dependent Variable: REALTAX/CP
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Regression – Real capital expenditures per capita

Model Summary

Model
1

R

R Square
a

.391

Adjusted R

Std. Error of

Square

the Estimate

.153

.140

164.1985811

a. Predictors: (Constant), Popo65, Election Year,
REALCANCOND, Densqkm, REALONTUNCOND,
REALONTCOND, Popu15

Coefficients

a

Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B
(Constant)

Std. Error

-225.485

215.372

8.795

15.573

.444

Coefficients
Beta

t

Sig.

-1.047

.296

.025

.565

.573

.607

.042

.733

.464

-.469

.155

-.230

-3.024

.003

REALONTCOND

.449

.071

.542

6.345

.000

Densqkm

.000

.013

.001

.019

.985

Popu15

2055.569

806.974

.249

2.547

.011

Popo65

891.970

498.039

.172

1.791

.074

Election Year
REALCANCOND
REALONTUNCOND

a. Dependent Variable: REALCAPEXP
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Regression – Real protection services capital expenditures per capita

Model Summary

Model
1

R

R Square
a

.224

Adjusted R

Std. Error of

Square

the Estimate

.050

.035

16.3503158

a. Predictors: (Constant), Popo65, Election Year,
REALCANCOND, Densqkm, REALONTUNCOND,
REALONTCOND, Popu15

Coefficients

a

Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B
(Constant)

Std. Error

18.285

21.446

1.869

1.551

.114

Coefficients
Beta

t

Sig.
.853

.394

.055

1.205

.229

.060

.115

1.883

.060

-.008

.015

-.040

-.502

.616

.012

.007

.151

1.670

.096

-.003

.001

-.117

-2.163

.031

Popu15

33.206

80.356

.043

.413

.680

Popo65

-66.632

49.593

-.137

-1.344

.180

Election Year
REALCANCOND
REALONTUNCOND
REALONTCOND
Densqkm

a. Dependent Variable: REALPROCAP
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Regression – Real planning and development capital expenditures per capita

Model Summary

Model
1

R

R Square
a

.199

Adjusted R

Std. Error of

Square

the Estimate

.040

.025

28.6507889

a. Predictors: (Constant), Popo65, Election Year,
REALCANCOND, Densqkm, REALONTUNCOND,
REALONTCOND, Popu15

Coefficients

a

Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B

Std. Error

(Constant)

3.579

37.580

Election Year

-.727

2.717

REALCANCOND

.193

REALONTUNCOND

Coefficients
Beta

t

Sig.
.095

.924

-.012

-.268

.789

.106

.112

1.827

.068

.046

.027

.137

1.691

.091

-.009

.012

-.067

-.734

.463

.005

.002

.113

2.075

.039

Popu15

-3.452

140.808

-.003

-.025

.980

Popo65

49.500

86.902

.058

.570

.569

REALONTCOND
Densqkm

a. Dependent Variable: REALPLANDEVEL/CP
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Regression – Real transportation capital expenditures per capita

Model Summary

Model
1

R

R Square
a

.343

Adjusted R

Std. Error of

Square

the Estimate

.118

.104

57.4118072

a. Predictors: (Constant), Popo65, Election Year,
REALCANCOND, Densqkm, REALONTUNCOND,
REALONTCOND, Popu15

Coefficients

a

Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B
(Constant)

Std. Error

5.445

.332

Sig.

.063

1.432

.153

.212

.092

1.565

.118

-.039

.054

-.055

-.711

.478

REALONTCOND

.089

.025

.313

3.592

.000

Densqkm

.010

.004

.113

2.165

.031

Popu15

349.408

282.157

.124

1.238

.216

Popo65

-39.728

174.139

-.022

-.228

.820

REALONTUNCOND

7.798

t

.807

REALCANCOND

75.304

Beta

.245

Election Year

18.443

Coefficients

a. Dependent Variable: REALTRANSCAP/CP

49
Regression – Real recreation and culture capital expenditures per capita

Model Summary

Model
1

R

R Square
a

.271

Adjusted R

Std. Error of

Square

the Estimate

.074

.059

76.75846973

a. Predictors: (Constant), Popo65, Election Year,
REALCANCOND, Densqkm, REALONTUNCOND,
REALONTCOND, Popu15

Coefficients

a

Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B
(Constant)

Std. Error

-128.355

100.680

Election Year

6.116

7.280

REALCANCOND

-.338

REALONTUNCOND

Coefficients
Beta

t

Sig.

-1.275

.203

.038

.840

.401

.284

-.072

-1.193

.233

-.043

.073

-.047

-.589

.556

REALONTCOND

.007

.033

.019

.212
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Densqkm

.013

.006

.117

2.186

.029

Popu15

891.270

377.239

.242

2.363

.019

Popo65

140.634

232.820

.061

.604

.546

a. Dependent Variable: REALRECCULTURECAP
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Regression – Total employment per capita

Model Summary

Model

R

R Square
a

1

.503

Adjusted R

Std. Error of the

Square

Estimate

.253

.245

.00509383

a. Predictors: (Constant), YrB4Election, Popu15, Densqkm, Election
Year, Popo65

a

Coefficients

Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B

Std. Error

(Constant)

.034

.006

Election Year

.000

.001

1.649E-6

Popu15

Coefficients
Beta

t

Sig.
5.316

.000

-.036

-.738

.461

.000

.203

4.716

.000

-.123

.024

-.450

-5.140

.000

Popo65

.005

.015

.029

.323

.747

YrB4Election

.000

.001

.022

.443

.658

Densqkm

a. Dependent Variable: EMP/CAP
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Regression – Part-time employment per capita

Model Summary
Adjusted R
Std. Error of
Model
R
R Square
Square
the Estimate
a
1
.492
.242
.232
.0029675
a. Predictors: (Constant), Popo65, Election Year, Densqkm,
Ont. Unemployment, YrB4Election, Popu15
Coefficients

a

Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
B
Std. Error
1
(Constant)
.000
.005
Election Year
.000
.000
YrB4Election
.002
.000
Ont. Unemployment
.133
.040
Densqkm
5.049E-7
.000
Popu15
-.029
.014
Popo65
.004
.009
a. Dependent Variable: PARTTIMECAP

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
-.138
.237
.157
.108
-.187
.036

t
-.112
-2.761
4.613
3.296
2.487
-2.127
.403

Sig.
.911
.006
.000
.001
.013
.034
.687
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Regression – Seasonal employment per capita

Model Summary
Adjusted R
Std. Error of
Model
R
R Square
Square
the Estimate
a
1
.355
.126
.114
.0020604
a. Predictors: (Constant), Popo65, Election Year, Densqkm,
Ont. Unemployment, YrB4Election, Popu15

Coefficients

a

Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
B
Std. Error
1
(Constant)
-.004
.003
Election Year
.000
.000
YrB4Election
.001
.000
Ont. Unemployment
.088
.028
Densqkm
1.435E-7
.000
Popu15
.000
.010
Popo65
.001
.006
a. Dependent Variable: SEASONALCAP

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
-.164
.112
.161
.047
.002
.009

t
-1.251
-3.046
2.033
3.142
1.018
.026
.092

Sig.
.212
.002
.043
.002
.309
.980
.927
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Correlation – Real own purpose lower-tier taxation per capita and real capital expenditures per
capita

Correlations
REALTAX/CP REALCAPEXP
REALTAX/CP

Pearson Correlation

1

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
REALCAPEXP Pearson Correlation

**

.467

.000
486

486

**

1

.467

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

N

486

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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